Sorry for the extremely light posting. Between work and
final preparations for the book, I’ve had very little time for blogging, though
if you follow my Twitter feed I’ve been fairly active over there.
But it has not stopped me from reading my usual dozen or so
books at one time, so let’s do a book review.
John Bell Hood is a controversial figure in Civil War
histories, generally seen as brave (he lost the use of one arm and one leg to
battle wounds), but overly aggressive and rather stupid. He is most (in)famous
for the ill-fated
1864 Nashville Campaign, in which he led
the Confederate Army of Tennessee in an invasion of its namesake, with the
operational objectives of liberation of the state and potentially driving up to
the Ohio River, and the strategic objectives of forcing Union General William
T. Sherman to abandon his march to the sea and move west to stop Hood.
It was a desperate move, but by this point in the war with
the Mississippi, Chattanooga, and Atlanta now in Union hands, the Confederacy
was well-past desperation.
Sherman did not move west. To stop Hood’s move, Union
General George (“Rock of Chickamauga”) Thomas was collecting federal troops in
a blocking position at Nashville, which had been held by the Union for 3 years
and was heavily fortified. The trick was that those troops had to beat Hood’s
army to Nashville.
For Union General John Schofield, this was kind of a
problem, since his troops were directly in Hood’s line of march. That problem
became a grave crisis on November 29, 1864, when Hood managed to outflank
Schofield and get between the Union army and Nashville near
Spring Hill. But through command and
control problems and a poor deployment of the army, Hood’s troops did not block
the road which Schofield was using to march to Nashville, and Schofield’s
troops marched within a football field of Hood’s sleeping troops during the
night and escaped. When Hood woke up the next morning, he went had breakfast
with his senior generals at a mansion with the bizarre name of
Rippavilla and
supposedly threw a tantrum for the ages.
Schofield continued his flight northward towards Nashville,
but was blocked by the flooded Harpeth River at the town of Franklin. As his
forces repaired two damaged bridges and started his supply train across, his
infantry and artillery were forced to deploy in defensive positions facing south.
Sure enough, late that afternoon, Hood’s troops caught up with him.
The result was the
Battle of Franklin, one of the bloodiest
battles of the Civil War and Hood’s most controversial action. With the fading
light, Hood ordered a frontal assault, and the Confederate infantry charged
over two miles of open ground with no artillery support against prepared Union
positions with enfilading artillery coverage from an artillery position on the
north side of the Harpeth called Fort Granger. It was a slaughter.
The Confederates suffered 6,252
casualties, including 1,750 killed and 3,800 wounded. Fourteen Confederate
generals (six killed or mortally wounded, seven wounded, and one captured) and
55 regimental commanders were casualties. Among the dead were “The Stonewall of
the West” Patrick Cleburne and the talented States Rights Gist (yes, that was
his real name).
As one might expect given that Sam Hood is a relative of
John Bell Hood, John Bell Hood is a defense of the Confederate general.
In fact, it is more of a defense than it is a history, and it, while it does
present excerpts of many of the accusations against Hood, assumes considerable knowledge on the part
of the reader of both the Civil War and the conventional opinion of Hood’s
actions.
One might say that at times Sam Hood tries too hard to
defend the general. One of the generally accepted beliefs is that Confederate
General Robert E. Lee had a low opinion of General Hood and was not happy at
the prospect of his selection for commander of the Army of Tennessee to replace
General Joseph Johnston (himself another controversial figure) during the
Atlanta campaign. Sam Hood, who is honest in presenting contradictory evidence,
gives Lee’s statements about John Bell Hood to Confederate President Jefferson
Davis. First is this:
Telegram of today received. I regret the fact
stated. It is a bad time to release the commander of an army situated as that
of Tennessee,. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I
am doubtful as to other qualities necessary. (Page 12.)
Lee would later elaborate:
I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your
telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change the commander of an army
situated as that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I
know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped Johnston was strong enough to
deliver battle. We must risk much to save Alabama, Mobile and communications
with the Trans Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all of the cavalry
in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman’s communications. If Johnston abandons
Atlanta I suppose he will fall back on Augusta. This loses us Mississippi and
communications with Trans Mississippi. We had better therefore hazard that
communication to retain the country. Hood is a good fighter, very industrious
on the battle field, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his
actions, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion
of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General (William) Hardee has more
experience in man aging an army. (Pages 12-13.)
Sam Hood’s conclusion:
In the morning, Lee had rejected
not Hood, but rather the act of changing the Army of Tennessee’s command.
However, later that same day, after considering the broad geopolitical and
military consequences of losing Atlanta, Lee agreed that a change in commanders
was necessary. Lee, upon further thought, seemed to endorse Hood, making five
positive comments and one negative about his former subordinate. Lee […] noted
only Hardee’s previous army management experience but had nothing else to say
about him. […]
Lee’s cautious advice to Davis
about one of his favorite former subordinates an hardly be taken as a rejection
of the proposal to install Hood, although many authors and historians have
stated that Lee advised against elevating Hood. The full text of Lee’s longer
reply to Davis, rarely provided by authors, speaks for itself. (Page 13.)
Indeed it does, but it does not say what Sam Hood says it
says. He calls Lee’s response “cautious” and says Lee “seemed to endorse Hood.”
Really? Given that John Bell Hood was indeed one of Lee’s favorite
subordinates, don’t you think he would have given a more glowing endorsement
than this? If Lee was endorsing Hood, so you think he would have ever said “I
am doubtful as to other qualities necessary?” Lee compliment’s Hood’s bravery
and fighting ability, but little else. Lee’s statements read like specifically
not endorsing Hood while not coming out and saying as much, so as not to be
seen as betraying a friend.
For a second example, Sam Hood tries very, very hard to
refute the charge that John Bell Hood accused his troops of cowardice,
especially after the “affair” at Spring Hill. He does present the quote that is
used to support the charge, which comes from John Bell Hood’s own memoirs Advance
& Retreat. The quote is a full paragraph:
The best move of my career as a soldier, I was thus
destined to behold come to naught. The
discovery that the Army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles,
was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of
breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart I
questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It
seemed to me I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this
stumbling block to the Army of Tennessee. And I will here inquire, in
vindication of its fair name, if any intelligent man of that Army supposes one
moment that these same troops one year previous, would, even without orders to
attack, have allowed the enemy to pass them as Rocky-faced Ridge, as he did at
Spring Hill. (Page 214.)
Sam Hood comments:
Nowhere do the words “fear,” “bravery,” “cowardice,”
or “courage” appear in this or any other paragraph relating to this event. All
Hood explained was his frustration at the army’s apparent unwillingness to
accept battle unless from behind breastworks, which he believed was a
“stumbling block” instilled by the tactics of the previous commander. (Page
214.)
A fair interpretation, but by no means the only one or, in
my opinion and that of many other historians, the most likely one. For one
thing, you do not need to use the words “fear,” “bravery,” “cowardice,” or
“courage” to accuse someone of cowardice. Just call them “chicken.” Accusing
someone of an “unwillingness to fight” someone unless behind breastworks can
reasonably (and easily) be interpreted as cowardice.
Such stretches are found throughout the book. But that is
merely a minor note. Most of Sam Hood’s defenses of John Bell Hood are well
reasoned, worthy of consideration, and in many cases persuasive. For instance,
as ugly and perhaps Quixotic as the Nashville campaign was, it was done with
the complete knowledge and support of Jefferson Davis. Far from keeping
Richmond in the dark as to the desperate plight of his army, Hood kept them
well informed. Hood also did try his best to take care of his troops,
requesting reinforcements and supplies at every opportunity, only to be
repeatedly turned down. Sam Hood presents John Bell’s Hood’s tactics as
desperate but defensible, which is a reasonable position.
Sam Hood’s
John Bell Hood is more case than history,
and not always a convincing case, but it presents enough of a case to merit a
re-examination of John Bell Hood. And it is a very enjoyable read. The
publisher Savas Beatie has made a habit of making high-quality history books
focusing on the United States. This is yet another. While not agreeing with all
of Sam Hood’s conclusions, it is well worth it to buy
John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General and decide for yourself.
